For Prof. Pandit
with best regards
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RECOGNITION IN PRATYABHIJÑĀ SCHOOL : A STUDY IN EPISTEMOLOGY

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The idea of recognition has been mainly employed in Indian philosophy to establish permanent self or knower. This argument has been used in the main to propound against 'Self'-negating schools, the Buddhists being the principal ones among them, that the processes of knowledge such as remembrance and recognition require a lasting substratum and therefore existence of attributes (*dharmas*) cannot be denied.[1] It is on the basis of objective recognition that a substantive is apprehended as such even when its attributes have undergone a change.

Prevalent views with regard to recognition as a means of knowledge may be grouped under three categories : (i) those who consider this knowledge i. e., 'this is that jar' as one; in this class come the Naiyāyikas etc.; (ii) those, who consider the elements of perception and memory in this knowledge as distinct, find two knowledges in this sentence; the Buddhists perdominate here; and (iii) those who consider it bi-dimensional (*ubhayātmaka*) or synthetic; the Trika or Pratyabhijñā School of Kashmir may be placed under this category.[2]

The Naiyāyikas view recognition as a kind of determinate perception. To recognise an object is to know it as a definite or determinate entity. Hence, on the face of it recognition is determinate perception. But technically recognition is taken as a complex psychosis of presentative and representative processes of knowledge. Whatever is seen at the moment is also remembered as an object of previous perception. And these two jointly account for the familiar meaning of the term recognition. This leads us to think that recognition is dependent upon memory and is a complex process. But the Naiyāyika believes that recognition does not fall within the purview of complex psychosis instead, within that of a qualified psychosis.[3]

1. The author of the *Vyāsabhāṣya* has adduced three reasons in refutation of negation of the substantive — impossibility of memory, non-fruition of deeds, and absence of recognition. For the last item see *Yogabhāṣya* 3.14 : "वस्तुप्रत्यभिज्ञानाच्च स्थितोऽन्वयी धर्मी यो धर्मान्यथात्वमभ्युपगतः प्रत्यभिज्ञायते । तस्मान्नेदं धर्ममात्रं निरन्वयमिति ।"

2. *Mānameya-rahasya-śloka-vārttika*, Lakṣmīpuram Śrīnivāsācārya, p. 310.

3. Cf. *Mind in Indian Philosophy*, Sarasvati Chennakesavan, p. 71.

Recognition is the knowledge or perception of a previously perceived object by the same person finding expression in such words as 'I have seen this object before'. From the *Nyāya Vārttika* (3. 2. 39, 3. 2. 42) we gather that recognition is not simply a perceptual process but also it is not quite different from the recollective process. Recollection is occasioned by memory associations (*saṁskāra*) and recognition consists in "knowing that a thing now perceived is the same as what was perceived before."[4] Since recognition is related to a particular object at a time, it is taken to be a unitary perception. The previous experience of the object leaves out its impressions which colour the present sensory perception. It is a kind of perception where the representative element or impression is predominant and the perceptual element remains in the background. In the words of the Bhāṣya, when a single object is connected with (*pratisandhita*) two cognitions occurring at two different times recognition takes place.[5] For the Naiyāyika recognition is perceptual and immediate, because whatever is caused by external sensory stimulus is immediate and perceptual in nature.[6] Perception imbibes sense contact with and unmediated acquaintance of the object. The whole experience is therefore perceptual and immediate in spite of the fact that its content becomes meaningful only with the aid of latent or subconscious impressions. Synchronous consciousness (*sahacetanā*) of the past and the present grasp of the same object[7] is recognition.

The Mīmāṁsakas and the Jainas, too, fall nearly under the same category. The Mīmāṁsakas do not distinguish recognition from determinate perception. This is a kind of perception in which the name of an object becomes its adjective. That is to say, an object is qualified by the word or name by which it is called : this is that Devadatta. This view finds enough support in Bhartṛhari. The Jainas subscribe to the independent existence of recognition. It is a separate category of knowledge by itself. To know that the object has been perceived once is recognition. It is unitary cognition. According to Jainas analogy (*upamāna*), too, is recognitive in character.

According to the Buddhist, who views elements of presentation (perception) and representation (recollection) as different, recognition of an object follows from close similarity between the experienced and the remembered in spite of the temporal and spatial distinctions. Although a flame

4. *Mitabhāṣiṇī*, p. 25, quoted, ibid., p. 73.

5. "पूर्वापरयोर्विज्ञानयोरेकविषये प्रतिसंधितज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ।" *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, 3. 1. 7.

6. *Nyāya Sūtra*, 1.1.4.

7. "पूर्वाभिज्ञानविशिष्टग्राह्यमाणयिष्यतां प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् ।" *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 461; "अतीतकालविशिष्टो वर्तमानकालावच्छिन्नश्चार्थ एतस्यामवभासते ।" Ibid., p. 459.

qualified by the preceding moment is different from one qualified by the succeeding moment the feeling is retained that it is the same flame. In our daily life a person is recognised to be the same in spite of apparent changes in beard, mustache, nails, and complexion, etc.. In the words of Bhāskara, the celebrated commentator of Abhinavagupta's *Vimarśinī*, this similarity (not identity) is such as includes differences within and may therefore be called difference-animated similarity (*bhedaprāṇa-sādṛśya*)[8] because the distinctions (according to the Buddhist) do not touch upon the real nature of an object. The real, i. e., a moment, is entirely different from the other moment. The appearance of identity between the two is purely a mental construction.[9] Objectively viewed, our entire world of discourse is moving on the crutches of recognition of this very similarity. The Buddhist treats recognition as a mechanical compound of perception and memory. It is neither synthesis nor unity of the two. It is a sort of dual knowledge which points out to both the aspects respectively.

Let us look at certain other systems before we proceed to examine the Kashmir Śaivism to which recognition is a bi-dimensional or synthetic knowledge. In the Advaita Vedānta the independent discussion on recognition is almost nil, yet a close scrutiny reveals that there, too, it is unitary knowledge. Here expressions like 'Thou art that' (*tattvamasi*), 'Verily this is that Davadatta' (*so 'yaṁ Devadattaḥ*) are considered identity propositions. The proposition 'Verily this is that Devadatta', when analysed, fails to express any consistent meaning. 'This' (*ayam*) means — 'conditioned by present time and space', that is to say, something that is visible here and now (at this point of time and space); 'That' (*saḥ*) means— 'conditioned by other time and space', that is to say, 'something that has been seen then and there' (at some other point of time and space). Since these two adjuncts contradict each other, 'this' cannot be 'that'. Conditioned by two different determining adjuncts the same substantive becomes different logically. There remains only one way out to keep such sentences as consistent and meaningful: to understand the identity of the substantive— e. g. Devadatta— on its own by eliminating or negating its adjuncts. By adopting this method of interpretation the Great Sentence (*mahāvākya*) of the Upaniṣad — 'Thou art that' (*tattvamasi*) – may be made to yield a coherent meaning.

8. *Bhāskarī*, edited by Iyer and Pandey, Part I, p. 112.

9. "सादृश्याच्च तत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञा भिन्नेऽपि कालकेशनखादाविव" *Bhāskarī* (*Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī*), Part I, p. 112; see also: "सा च केशनखादौ सर्वत्रैव भिन्ने भवन्ती न वस्तु अपेक्षते वस्तुनस्तथाभूतस्य अयोगादिति बाधकाधीनमेव प्रत्यभिज्ञानाप्रामाण्यमिति तदेव परदूषणे प्रपततीति प्राक् बाधकमुक्तम्। विरुद्धेन अन्योन्यमभवनमाक्षिपता धर्मेण योऽध्यासोऽधिष्ठानम्।" *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vivṛti-vimarśinī*, Part I, p. 192.

There in this sentence (where Thou stands for empirical consciousness and That for Absolutic consciousness) the required identity is brought about by rejecting the two incompatible adjuncts (empirical and Absolutic— Jīvatva and Pūrṇatva) and by affirming consciousness that is common to both. In such propositions the meaning actually consists in the residual part and the method of interpretation employed here is technically known as Jahat-ajahat-lakṣaṇā[10] (exclusive-inclusive implication).

Rāmānuja does not agree with Śaṁkara on this point. For him our total perceptual experience is judgemental—determinate, indeterminate both. Still there is a distinction between determinate perception and recognition. In recognition (e. g. This is that Devadatta) one and the same object is perceived twice, whereas in determinate perception several objects of the same type figure in our knowledge. While in both these cognitions the content is characterized by the revival of previous impressions of the attributive element, recognition also carries the impression of the individual object. Moreover, while judgement underlies the whole perception, recognition does contain reference to the distinctions of time and space also. Not only is the determinate object known at the first stage of perception, but all our cognition— including knowledge of the ultimate reality— is necessarily knowledge of the determinate and qualified object. Thus the propositions like 'Thou art that' (*tattvamasi*) etc. are not denotative of unity or identity but of uni-locality (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) of Thou and That. 'That' stands for the 'Brahman' which is prius of innumerable benign attributes and 'Thou' for the 'Brahman' which has the body of 'Jīva' qualified by the Conscious and Unconscious principles (*Cit* and *Acit*).[11]

There are two ways in which the principle of uni-locality (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) definitely refers to the qualified object. The contradictory elements like 'partial knowerhood' (*kiñcit-jñātā*) and 'universal knowerhood' (*sarva-jñatā*) are not denied; because relation of one and the same object with past and present times is not mutually incompatible — at that time it 'was' there, at this time it 'is' here. Relationship with different places does not cause any anomaly because of difference in time. Likewise identity of

10. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, edition of Svāmī Mādhavānanda, pp. 36–37, 100–103; also see *Six Ways of Knowing*, D. M. Datta, pp. 319–20.

11. "तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्येषु सामानाधिकरण्यं न निर्विशेषवस्त्वैक्यपरम्, तत्त्वंपदयोस्सविशेषब्रह्माभिधायित्वात् । ··· सोऽयं देवदत्तः इत्यत्रापि न लक्षणा, भूतवर्तमानकालसंबन्धितयैक्यप्रतीत्यविरोधात् । देशभेदविरोधश्च कालभेदेन परिहृतः । ··· जीवशरीरकजगत्कारणब्रह्मपरत्वे मुख्यवृत्तं पदद्वयम् । प्रकारद्वयविशिष्टैकवस्तुप्रतिपादनेन सामानाधिकरण्यं च सिद्धम् ।" *Śrībhāṣya*, Annangaracharya's edition, pp. 96–98; and also *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, Hiriyanna, p. 387 (Second Edn.).

Empirical Self and the Mataphysical Self in the form of body and soul does not pose an enigma.[12]

Now we come to the third and the last category including the Pratyabhijñā school. Nowhere recognition, whether by way of cognition or cognitive instrument, has been so lustily cheered as in the monistic Śaivism of Kashmir. In fact, the philosophical school propounded by Somānanda has acquired the very name of Pratyabhijña school.[13] Behind such christening underlies the idea of recognition of the self as the Godhead or the ultimate principle of experience. 'I am that' (*so 'ham*) — I am that ultimate unitary principle — is an expression of the ultimate recognition. Therefore, the removal of ignorance towards the object of recognition and knowing of the same turn out to be the additional aims of the system.[14]

In order to understand the concept of recognition it is necessary to comprehend the precise nature of a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). In most systems a means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) is that instrument of right or valid knowledge which reveals a 'new' and 'hitherto unrealised' (in the Advaita Vedānta 'uncontradicted' too) object.[15] Udyotakara etc. have gone in for the existence of God on the strength of reason only treading the similar line. But this position loses much of its force because the God that is inferred as the conscious being and agent is neither 'new' nor 'unrealised' since each object is apprehended in its universal form (at the time of determining the relation of universal concomitance i. e., *vyāpti*). Hence even that God, too, is not 'new' in its universal aspect. Employment of a particular instrument of cognition leads to the knowledge of an object in its 'particularity' and not in its 'newness'. That is why here the function of a cognitive instrument is to allay ignorance towards the pre-established (*pūrvasiddha*) object of knowledge. "In front is a jar since it is being perceived" — this inference does not make the jar known, jar is already available through perception, otherwise the middle term (*hetu*) will remain unestablished in the minor term (*pakṣa*). Thus a means of knowledge does not accomplish an object (*kāraka*) nor does it make the same known (*jñāpana*). Its function, therefore, is neither productive nor informative. It has only one negative function to discharge—to remove stupor or

12. See *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, Abhyankar's edition, pp. 101–104.

13. *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-kārikā*, 1. 1. 1, 4.1. 6–7.

14. *Bhāskarī* (*Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vimarśinī*) Pt. I, pp. 8, 16, 315; *Īśvara-pratyabhijñā-vivṛti-vimarśinī*, Pt. I, p. 47.

15. "अपूर्वप्रकाशनरूपं तत्र ज्ञानं यतो भवति, तादृक् प्रमाणं वक्तव्यम् ।" *I. P. V. V.*, Part I, p. 40.

veil from the object.[16] The same role is also extended to recognition which is intended to cater pragmatic ends.[17] A means of knowledge, therefore, tries to grasp the natural and essential character of the object by breaking through the veil of ignorance, i. e., by dismantling the superficial coverings of an object; establishing an object is simply beyond its scope.

Recognition is the re-knowing or re-acquainting (*prati+abhijñāna*) of the same object. It is unitary knowledge. Recognition is a process of unification of an object that has appeared (*bhāta*) once with the object that is appearing (*bhāsamāna*) at the moment, as for example in this judgement — this is that John. This element of 'sameness' is an outcome of identity, not similarity, of the two experiences. The verbal components of the Sanskrit term Pratyabhijñā[18] e. g., *prati*, *abhi*, and *jñā* stand respectively for *pratīpa* (opposite) or *pratisaṁdhāna* (redirecting), *ābhimukhya* (readiness to encounter), and *jñāna* (knowledge).[19] *Pratīpa* conveys the same meaning as does its English counterpart 'opposite' (e. g., 'opposite my house', which means 'in front of my house'). That is to say, the knowledge (*jñāna*) of an object, when it reverts (*pratīpa*) and faces the knower (*abhimukha*), is styled as recognition, viz., which was apprehended in the past is being apprehended presently. Hence *prati-saṁdhāna* by implication means uniting or joining together. In simple words the meaning would be that our touch with previously known object is lost through the passage of time and the same is restored at the time of subsequent apprehension by reviving the memory.[20]

Unification in technical language means removal of (scrapping of) the intervening stupor in between the two experiences. We saw X in the past and now we see him again. Had our connection with him continued uninterrupted during the intervening period the resulting cognition would be 'this is X'; instead our cognition takes the form 'this is that X'. Such recognition is possible only when our cognitive relation with the object has broken off after the first perception. This gap in experience towards the object or lack of knowledge in the middle is cast aside. This is what is termed as removal of objective ignorance. This process of unification must take place on a single substratum. In other words, such a cognition resulting from synchronous activity of experience and memory cognises that object in which

16. "न कारकव्यापारो भगवति, नापि ज्ञापकव्यापारोऽयम्, अपि तु मोहापसारणमात्रमेतत्, व्यवहारसाधनानां प्रमाणानां तावत्येव विश्रान्तेः।" *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Part I, p. 59.

17. "व्यवहारसाधनरूपं प्रत्यभिज्ञानं मोहापसारणफलम्।" *I. P. V. V.*, Part I, p. 39.

18. "भातभासमानरूपानुसंधानात्मिका।" *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Part I, p. 36. *Bhāskarī* on the same "पूर्वभातमद्य भासमानं तयोर्यदनुसंधानम्-एकीकरणम्।".

19. Here the word is dissolved as *prati* + *abhi* + *jñāna*, elsewhere as *prati* + *abhijñāna*.

20. *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Pt. I, p. 37.

'this' and 'that' elements are fused together. This leads us to the necessary conclusion that both sense-contact and revival of impression are the causes of recognition. In recollective impression the previous experience of an object lies buried in the subconscious and confrontation with the object through senses revives the relative impressions. Owing to the singleness of the object of both memory and perception the underlying unity surfaces itself in recognition. On this point the Trika concept of recognition may be distinguished from the Buddhist one which posits it as a dual knowledge where 'this' and 'that' aspects signify separate entities. Recognition is a unitary knowledge of 'this-that' elements blended together because what we have cognised is not the separate knowledge of the two but of the one in which both the elements have melted together.[21]

In the Nyāya School recognition is conceived as unitary knowledge, meaning thereby that the elements of presentation and re-presentation are not intra-distinguished. In order to achieve this the Nyāya resorts to a particular process. There it is the knowledge of a qualified object — qualified by past and present times. That is, though the object of knowledge remains the same it is grasped as qualified by two times. In still clearer words, recognition brings to us cognition of such an object which exists at present and is conditioned by its relation with the past. It is a unitary psychosis because the re-presentative element like impressions (of past experiences) blend with the presentative element in such a way as to give us a single percept. Indeed in the Pratyabhijñā School, too, the object exists at both the times — once in the past and once at the time of instantaneous experience, but here the Trika philosopher falls back upon a special process technically designated as *ubhayamelana-prakriyā* (commingling process of the two) in order to bring about the unity between past and present.[22] Our knowledge of an object is not characterised by two times. Even if it takes something from either of them, it is the uni-objectivity of experiences occurring at different points of time. Memory belongs not to object but to its experience. 'This is blue'—this knowledge with objective reference is experience and the same turns out to

21. "स्मरणानुभवारूढा सामानाधिकरण्यधीः ।
संस्कारेन्द्रियजन्या च प्रत्यभिज्ञा प्रकीर्तिता ॥"

This reference is from certain Śaiva text. While taking notes the exact particulars of the text appear to have slipped.

Contextually one observation may be made here. The metaphysical experience at the level of Śuddhā Vidyā finding expressions in 'I am this', too, is recognitive and unilocative.

22. "ज्ञातस्य पुनरभिमुखीभावावसरे प्रतिसंधिप्राणितमेव ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिज्ञा ।" *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Part I, p. 37; see Bhāskara's commentary also—"प्रतिसंधिना सोऽयमिति एकीकरणेन, प्राणितं सत्तायुक्तं कृतम् ।".

be memory from the point of view of the object that is presently being viewed. 'That' grasps the recollective experience and not the object. When both memory and experience address themselves to the sensible object and attain singleness of percept, their conceptual identity turns out to be recognition. The objective unity of the two experiences results from the synthesis of two cognitions.[23]

Thus, unlike the single psychosis in the Nyāya, recognition is a complex psychosis in the mind of the Trika philosopher, for it is difficult to forget that perception and memory arise from the present sensation as well as the impressions of one that has gone before. They cannot be reduced to one. Because such an eventuality will immediately raise the problem as to what is the exact nature of the perceived object. If it is only an object of the past experience, there remains only a nominal difference between recognition and memory and it will be difficult to account for the perceptual element containing reference to the present. It cannot be an instantaneous or presentative event alone, because it embodies its identity with something that happened in the past. Recognition, therefore, is unification of the 'appearing' and the 'appeared'. Apprehension or perception leads to the knowledge of an object and memory to the unification of the present and past objects of experience.[24] This conclusion is a clear enunciation of the fact that there remains definitely some element of recognition in all our cognitions and concepts. Only in the present experience (i. e., determinate) the representative element is so insignificant that normally it does not come into focus. In recognition the representative element emerges and puts a damper on the presentative element.[25] In other words, presentative element (this) is explained or accounted for in terms of re-presentative one (that). Another situation may also be visualised where element of memory may surface itself but the emphasis on the presentative element is not impaired. In such a situation memory comes to be subordinate to experience but this element of subordinacy is quite marginal when compared to the insignificance of recollective element figuring in the determinate perception. Whereas in this situation distinction of recognition from determinate perception is clear, the relative predominance and subordi-

23. "अनुसंधानम् स्मृतानुभूतयोरेकीकरणरूपम्, प्रत्यभिज्ञानम् प्रत्यभिज्ञा, एतदुभयमेलनात्मकम् प्रोक्तानुभवसरणपरामर्शमेलनरूपम्।" *Bhāskarī*, Part I, p. 189.

24. "अनुभवस्य भानम् अयं नील इत्याद्यर्थविषयस्य ज्ञानस्य यदेतद्भानं, तन्नीलाद्यर्थव्यपेक्षया स्मृतिः। सोऽर्थस्य स इति स्मृतिमूलभूतानुभवः परामृश्यते। अर्थस्येत्यत्र भानमित्यनुकृष्यते। अर्थस्य भानं त्वनुभव इत्यर्थः। द्वौ सह तावेतौ स्मृत्यनुभवौ द्वावपि दृष्टचरार्थप्रतिसन्धानवेलायामेकप्रत्ययतापन्नौ अनुसंधानं प्रत्यभिज्ञोच्यते।" *Virūpākṣa-pañcāśikā*, 39, Commentary of Vidyākakravartī.

25. "तदौन्मुख्यं विना तदवस्थाग्रहणासंभवात्। तत्प्रतिसंधानेन तत्स्मृत्या एकीकरणेन। ज्ञानम् प्रत्यभिज्ञा।" *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Part I, p. 37.

nacy of recollective and experiential elements in recognition retain its (recognition's) character as a unitary psychosis even though it borders upon both. The first variety of recognition corresponds to the Naiyāyika position but the second one is the Trika's independent innovation. From all this it appears that for a Trika philosopher recognition is a complex, not single, psychosis, since the element of memory cannot be ignored. The phrases such as *ubhayaja* (arising from two), *ubhaya-melanātmaka*[26] (compresentative or synthetical) employed in this context point out to the complexity of psychosis that is recognition.[27]

Two are the constituents of recognitive cognition — memory and experience. Impressions of past experience lie deep within our sub-conscious. This constitutes the re-presentative factor in recognition. The other constituent is the present experience which defines the presentative factor therein. The mediate and immediate apprehensions of the same content are necessary parts of recognitive process. The experience of the presentative element is necessarily perceptual. The question is what is the nature of past experience — is it, too, perceptual or otherwise? This problem has not been directly tackled in the Pratyabhijñā School, but whatever has been said is enough to project the clear cut attitude of the system. There are only two types of knowledge in the past, either universal or particular. 'This is something' constitutes the form of the first type of knowledge and 'he is son of X, has such complexion and figure' constitutes the form of the other type of knowledge. In the context of the Trika system the first type is considered to be more significant. The original or particular cognition is perceptual. From the examples[28] put forth in the system to illustrate the concept of recognition, it is quite apparent that perceptuality is not the necessary condition of past knowledge. It is not necessary for the past knowledge to be perceptual. Although the majority of possibilities belongs to perception such situations are not totally absent[29] where the past knowledge is achieved through reason or verbal testimony. That is, past experience might be mediate and might

26. Lit., characterised by commingling.

27. We are here reminded of the position taken up by some sphoṭavādins. According to them each single cognition is a complex one partly perception and partly remembrance, perception so far as the last phoneme is concerned and remembrance as far as the previous phonemes are concerned. "स चैष प्रत्ययः स्मरणप्रत्यक्षरूपाभ्याम् उभयात्मा सदसद्वर्णरूपावभास्यन्त्यवर्णगोचर इष्यते कैश्चित्।" *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Maṇḍanamiśra, Kārikā 7, p. 20 (Iyer, Deccan College, 1966).

28. *Bhāskarī*, Pt. I, pp. 36–37.

29. See *Abhinavagupta : An Historical & Philosophical Study*, — Dr. K. C. Pandey, Second edition, p. 300.

also accrue through inference or information from other sources.[30] Such a

30. In the main four instances have been put forward for illustrating the concept of recognition in the system. They are : (i) *sa evāyaṁ Caitraḥ* (ii) *nṛpasya putraḥ* (iii) *kāminyāḥ nāyakaḥ* and (iv) *Īśvaro'ham*. Though on their face they appear to be identical, they necessarily are the outcome of varying underlying processes. It may also be noted that the first three in one way or the other subserve or strengthen the fourth possibility. The first i. e., *sa evāyaṁ Caitraḥ*, is an illustration of ordinary recognition in which the previous experience is repeated after lapse of time to the same percipient. In this case the previous experience is perceptual and the present experience is also perceptual. The perceptuality of the previous experience is retained in memory and is revived afresh by the subsequent perception resulting into a synthetic judgement. The second instance i. e., *nṛpasya putraḥ* (*nṛpeṇa putrasya pratyabhijñānam*), is very close to the first one except in the sense that at the time of subsequent cognition the percipient requires certain external assistance for identifying the content of previous experience. As the story has it, the son of a king was lost in his childhood and was discovered after a long interval as a grown-up man. The king had almost forgotten about him so much so that when the son was brought before him he could not recollect that he was his own blood. It was only after identification by the ministers with definite reference to his characteristic traits and marks that the king was able to recognize him. A comparative look at the two cases reveals that the subsequent cognition in the first instance is self-sufficient and is generated at the very sight of the object whereas the same in the second case is not self-sufficient but a derived cognition marked by two stages namely, (i) identification of the object by others with reference to its peculiar character and (ii) recognition of the object as such in the wake of such an identification. In this sense the second case is somewhat more complex than the first one. The third i. e., *kāminyāḥ nāyakaḥ* (*kāminyā śrutaguṇasya svanāyakasya pratyabhijñānam*), constitutes an altogether different type of recognition in which though the subsequent cognition is perceptual the previous one is not so. That is, the representative factor in its original form is mediate and conspicuous by the presence of imagination that has a definite role to play in it. Here the story runs like this. Close to its mythical parallel of Uṣā-Aniruddha episode a damsel heard a lot about the excellent qualities of a hero and fell in love with him though she had no occasion to meet him in person. Even when that person passed before her she was not able to identify him as the one she longed for in spite of the fact that she did notice him on these occasions. It was only on being told by her maid that it was he who had these qualities that she was able to recognise the hero of her imagination. This identification is also possible through some other source, instead of a maid, if it can competently project and identify the image of our imagination into one which is the object of perception at the moment. This example has been particularly employed to bring out the analogous character of metaphysical recognition. In the latter we are already informed of the essential character of our inner self as being possessed of the faculties of sentiency and agency (*jñāna* and *kriyā*) but we become conscious of the same only when we are made to realize through preceptorial initiation. This idea has been beautifully brought about in a verse quoted by Bhāskara Kaṇṭha :

Avasthitamavasthitaṁ na punaratra citraṁ mahān
Idaṁ prathamikārasaḥ sa khalu deśikāpāṅgabhūḥ |
Priyā na kimiyaṁ priyo na kimayaṁ kimetāvatā
Na cedayamudāradhīrucitakākureko janaḥ ||

— *Bhās.*, II, p. 315

On an epistemic analysis of the third case we find, as already pointed out earlier, that the previous phase is not marked by direct perception but by a mental construct or an image created on the basis of the percipient's information about the qualities of the experiential

(*Continued on the next page*)

position of Śaivists brings us quite near to the Western[31] concept of recognition which advocates that recognition is possible due to comparison between a mental image and the subsequent object. If mind has drawn a picture of an object due to any reason (including non-perceptual ones also) such as study, eulogy, praise or imagination and that picture subsequently resembles with or finds an echo in the object of perception, the resulting cognition would *ipso facto* be recognitive.

In this context a further problem may be raised whether recognition is an independent means of knowledge or it is included within Experience, Reason, and Scripture (*anubhava*, *yukti*, and *āgama*) commonly known as Perception, Inference, and Verbal Testimony respectively. It is interesting to watch that in spite of the tremendous importance attached to recognition, it has not been treated as a separate means of knowledge; instead, it has been subsumed under all the three[32] (not one). Recognition has been considered a sort of determinate knowledge, but at the same time it has been distinguished from determinate perception. Owing to its determinate character sometimes recognition is identified with perception[33] and sometimes with inference.[34] Such a treatment goes well with the metaphysical stipulations of the system. Because all the means of knowledge ultimately lead to self-recognition by removing ignorance.[35]

Though from the available data it is difficult to precisely determine the exact epistemic identity of recognition particularly in view of the Trika philosopher's attempt at including Pratyabhijñā under all the *pramāṇas*, it

(*Continued from the last page*)

object. Similarly the subsequent phase which refers to the revival of the previous experience is marked not by pure or simple perception but by perceptual activity mixed with informative one. This admixture of perception and information lends a uniqueness to the otherwise perceptual character of the second phase in the recognitive process. The fourth instance i. e., *Īśvaro'ham*, is in a sense an end-product marking the culmination of all the illustrations. It does not have independent epistemic value. Its epistemological significance lies in reminding us that all epistemology basically leads to and is governed by metaphysical considerations.

31. *Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. D. D. Runes, London, p. 265.

32. "इह दीर्घदर्शिना प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमान्यतमप्रमाणमूलां प्रत्यभिज्ञामाश्रित्य···। *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Part II, p. 195.

33. "निर्बाधप्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षप्रसाधितैकभावः पदार्थः।" *I. P. V. V.*, Part III, p. 2.

34. "प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमाद्यन्यतममानप्रत्यभिज्ञाबलेन···।" Ibid., p. 233.

35. "एतेन शक्तीनाम् इच्छाज्ञानक्रियाणां प्रकाशकेन प्रत्यभिज्ञारूपेण व्यवहारसाधनपरार्थानुमानात्मना शास्त्रेण तं व्यवहारं प्रवर्तयतां तत्समर्थाचरणं क्रियते।" *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Part II, p. 143.

The author is not very definite with regard to the relationship of recognition with other means of knowledge as envisaged above. But on the basis of available material such a conclusion may conveniently be drawn. However this problem may be left for future study.

can be safely observed that the perceptual element in recognition is immensely predominant. Because on a close analysis we find that inference, verbal testimony, and perception can only operate alternatively on the *bhāta* part (representative factor) but it is perception which invariably operates on the *bhāsamāna* part (presentative factor). Indeed, the perceptual activity connected with the presentative factor may in some cases not be as simple as it is made out to be; it is nevertheless perceptual on all counts. However, one of the possible reasons behind the Trika philosopher's enthusiasm in placing recognition under all types of means of knowledge is provided by his desire to outdo the Buddhist. The Buddhists regard recognition as determinate (*savikalpaka*). Determinate for them is not a mode of perception but a mode of cognition. For Kashmir Śaivism also recognition is necessarily determinate cognition though its inbuilt synthetic mechanism prevents it from resulting into analytic judgement. It may perhaps be in tune with the philosophical infrastructure of the system to view recognition as a generalised mode of cognition[36] leading to alternative equations with perception, inference, and verbal testimony but at the same time heavily loaded in favour of perception.

Trika philosopher joins hands with Bhartṛhari in positing that our entire cognitive process is recognitive. 'This is that' leads to the knowledge of universal object. 'That' of the time of formation of language (*saṁketa-kāla*– lit., grasping of conventional meaning) becomes one with 'this' of the practical and present knowledge. The symbol 'cow' becomes one with the object 'cow' at the time of bringing a cow on the scene. This reflects the process of unification of word and meaning. The Mīmāṁsaka also appears to agree on the same point. It is for this reason that all the determinate

36. On a close analysis the Buddhist will also epistemically endorse the Śaiva stand though with fundamental reservations on the metaphysical plane. For him our entire judgemental and determinate mental activity is *ipso facto* recognitive. Stcherbatsky (*Buddhist Logic*, Vol. II, pp. 20–21 fn., Dover edition, 1962), while examining the issue, points out that Dignāga (*Pramāṇa-samuccaya* 1. 3) understands by the term *nāmajātiguṇakriyādravyakalpanā* i. e. a construction or an arrangement (*yojanā*) of a presentation which includes name, genus, quality, function, and appertenances, the whole complex being referred to a particular moment of efficient reality (*svalakṣaṇa*). Thus the *abhilāpasaṁsarga* must be cosidered to include all other syntheses. *Kalpanā* thus corresponds to our judgement and more specially to a judgement in which the subject represents the predicate, that is, something indefinite to be made definite by the predicate, a judgement of the form 'this is that' *sa evāyam*. 'This is Ḍittha' is *nāma-kalpanā*, 'this is a patch of blue colour' is *guṇa kalpanā*, 'this is a cow' is *jāti-kalpanā*. This may be termed the 'epistemological' form of judgement and every judgement reduces to this form. Cp. Dharmottara on *Nyāya-bindu* 1. 5— "कुतः पुनरेतद्विकल्पोऽर्थान्नोत्पद्यते इति ? अर्थसंनिधिनिरपेक्षत्वात् । बालोऽपि हि यावद् दृश्यमानं स्तनं 'स एवायम्' इति पूर्वदृष्टत्वेन न प्रत्यवमृशति तावन्नोपरतरुदितो सुखमपयति स्तने । पूर्वदृष्टापरदृष्टं चार्थमेकीकुर्वद् ··· तादृशं चाभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यम् ।"

distinctions (*vikalpa-bheda* or variety of determinate cognitions) is dependent upon verbal or linguistic distinctions (*abhilāpa-bheda*).[37] Among the secondary types of determinate cognitions fall ' memory ' as in the cognition ' that ', ' rcognition ' as in ' this is that ', ' conjecture ' (*utprekṣā*) as in ' as if this is that ', and ' distinctive cognition ' (*vyavaccheda*) as in ' that is this '. But all of them are basically determinate in their character. Indeterminate, recognitive, conjectural— these various forms of knowledge differ with reference to their respective time, object, and form.[38] All these such as recognition etc., therefore, have been considered intrinsically determinate though the resulting cognitions arising therefrom are different.[39] In the same manner an effort has been made to account for the determinate character of these cognitions with reference to the difference between their temporal and spatial relations. Thus memory of an object results from connection with previous space and time, experience from connection with present space and time, and conjecture from possibility of connection with present space and time.[40]

Though recognition is determinate knowledge, it has been more specifically described as *ubhayaja* (arising from two), that is one that arises from determinate and indeterminate both.[41] That is, recognition is an outcome of the concurrent activity of the re-presentative and presentative both. ' That ' refers to determinate apprehension and ' this ' to the indeterminate. Revelation of a jar or its existential apprehension is indeterminate whereas apprehension of a jar with all its attributive accompaniments is determinate. By calling it *ubhayaja* the nature of recognition has been presented in an analytical manner but that does not affect the determinate character of recognition. The blending or synthesizing of two cognitive objects is no doubt a determinate function. At indeterminate stage a means of knowledge is not needed at all since it is characterized by diversity, that is, there remains distinction between the object and means of cognition. By virtue of its being a means of knowledge recognition amounts to a type of determinate cognition.[42] But here the unity of two experiential objects lying beneath such distinction is not interfered with. In other words, two percepts (memory and perception) meet here and from it proceeds identicality of the

37. " सोऽयमित्यभिसंबन्धाद्रूपमेकीकृतं यदा ।
शब्दस्यार्थेन तं शब्दमभिजल्पं प्रचक्षते ॥ " *Vākyapadīya* 2, 128.

38. *I. P. V. V.*, Pt. I, p. 115.

39. *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Pt. I, p. 86.

40. " आदिग्रहणात् प्रत्यभिज्ञोत्प्रेक्षणाध्यवसायादिविकल्पेषु अपि यथायोगं तदिदमिति इदं तदिति तदिव इदमिति तदेव इदमित्यादिनिर्देश्यता मन्तव्या उभयतः । " *I. P. V. V.*, Part II, p. 19.

41. *I. P. V. V.*, Pt. I, p. 148.

42. " घटप्रकाशः घटविषयं निर्विकल्पज्ञानम् । विकल्पः सविकल्पज्ञानम् । प्रत्यभिज्ञा सोयमित्युभयजं ज्ञानम् । " *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Part I, p. 84.

objects. Bhāskara's description of Buddhistic recognition as 'caused by difference-animated similarity'[43] (*bhedaprāṇasādṛśyanimittaka*) implies that the Trika recognition is 'caused by unity-animated similarity' (*abhedaprāṇasādṛśyanimittaka*). Two – 'that' and 'this' – are the constituents of the recognitive judgement 'this is that'. We shall now try to see what it implies. Implication of unification of two cognitive objects, we have already noted, is to remove the intervening gap. In fact, there is only one experience but the same is bifurcated by the veil of oblivion. Though both the experiences (perception, memory) are cut off in between due to the veil of forgetfulness resulting in mutual temporal gap, this interruption is nullified on the revival of the old experience due to meditation, re-perception, or any other reason. This, as a sequel, removes the possibility of temporal gap.[44] And even if the time factor is retained, there is a sort of contemporaneity between the subject and the object of cognition. That is, in the moment of cognition there is compresence (*vartamānakālatā*) of subject and object. The proposition of temporal gap can be understood only from this point of view. What we refer to by the word 'that' is one which in main has the subjectivity of cognition of 'this moment' for its object by objectifying cognition in the experience of 'that moment'. For a yogin the time is a superimposed entity even in respect of the object of previous knowledge. This is not imposed on an object at the time of an experience (time has nothing to do with the object at the time of its experience) because the time of experience is the same as of the subject at that moment. When the determinate process is on the move by combining the two (past and present experiences) such recognition as 'this is that' comes into being. Even that recognition is further subdivided into two owing to retention or repetition of the one and predication of the other cognition. Likewise recognition may have two types due to the co-repetition or co-predication of the past and present experiences.[45] In other words, both the elements may have the same significance or one may be predominant (predication) and the other subordinate (repetition) or vice versa. In Nyāya recognition is a simple psychosis because the element of experience is repeated and memory is predicated. But here synthetic function of a dual process keeps operative; hence recognition can come out only as a complex psychosis.

There are several secondary varieties of recognition. The quest for identity between the remembered and perceived has led to enumeration of

43. *I. P. V. V.*, Pt. I, p. 75.

44. *Bhāskarī*, Pt. I, p. 112.

45. 'This' and 'that' are mutually truncated (exclusive) experiences. But in recognition 'this' is transformed into 'that'.

sixteen and that for difference to the enumeration of sixty-four subvarieties. There are two possibilities of experience : (i) in instances like 'I am perceiving'—where knowledge or consciousness of object is accompanied by self-consciousness. Here the emphasis is on the unity of subject and object; (ii) in instances like 'this is'—where the perception is characterized by objective predominance. In the latter case even in the absence of a desire an object is perceived by strength of the object itself or by that of the specific purposive attitude of the subject / cognizer. Thus the resulting perception is twofold. Since it is the experienced that is being remembered, memory too goes twofold. All its subvarieties taken together memory happens to be of four kinds. Each experience contains two cognitions : experiential activity (I perceive- *dṛśyate*) and experiential object (this—*ayam*). Thus there are four cognitions in the two experiences (objective-cognition accompanied by self-cognition and objective-cognition characterized by objective preponderance). Memory also happens to be fourfold with reference to these. In the aforesaid six varieties of memory and experience is included recognition which is brought about by synthesis of the remembered and the experienced and which carries within cognition (*parāmarśa*) of memory and experience both. Recognition grows eightfold due to interaction of two varieties of experience and four of memory, because the blending of two cognitions defines recognition. Thus there may be fourfold memory of the past experience and twofold of the present one. As a consequence eight varieties of recognition go well. Though recognition is a synthesis of two experiential objects, at times there may be more emphasis on the object conditioned by the latter moment.[46] 'This is that' and 'that is this' may be cited as their respective illustrations. In other words, sometimes in recognition when presentative element becomes vocal re-presentative element remains subdued, and when the representative element gets vocal the presentative becomes subdued. It will be seen that the emphasis is a constant variable. This variety of emphasis leads to sixteen varieties of recognition.[47] But, since recognition is a unifying process of recollecion and the perceptual object, the subjective element always keeps predominance in the synthetic judgement. As a result the cognitive element too comes in focus. But the moment the two are separately placed, the preceptible or the object keeps in focus and the cognitive

46. "तथाहि अनुभवं तत्कालं परामर्शस्य अर्थनिष्ठत्वात् मन्यमानः एतत्कालपरामर्शस्य प्रमातृनिष्ठतां प्राधान्येन स्पृशति इदानीं भवत इव मम नीलानुभवोऽभूदिति। ··· यदा तु द्वयमेतत्संमील्य विकल्पयति, तदा प्रत्यभिज्ञानं सोऽयमिति। तत्र च एकतरानुवादैकतरविधेश्च भेदद्वयम्, ··· इत्यलं बहुना।" *I. P. V. V.*, Part II, pp. 16–17.

47. "तदेते द्वाविंशतिः संवेदनभेदाः। चत्वारः स्मरणभेदाः, द्वौ अनुभवभेदौ, षोडश प्रत्यभिज्ञाभेदाः।" *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Part I, pp. 188–189.

element retreats in the background. Thus the objective content is of four types in experience, of sixteen in memory, and of sixty-four in recognition which touches on both.[48]

Recognition seems to divide in two classes in view of its content.[49] Resulting judgement may fall under two heads—'I am that' (*so 'ham*) and 'it is mine' (*mamedam*). Naturally these are symbolic judgements. In the first symbol identity is sought between the two substantives (*dharmin*) and in the other symbol identity refers to attribute or property (*dharma*) as belonging to substantive. The first may be termed self-recognition or substantive recognition (*dharmi-pratyabhijñāna*) and the other attributive recognition (*dharma-pratyabhijñāna*). This quality of substantive attributive recognition leads us at metaphysical level to view the empirical or determinate creation (world as a thought construction) as idential with self or as manifestation or concretisation of self. In the technical language of the School recognition of Godliness aids recognition of the Godhead.

Quite often a word too acts as an aide in cognition of an object in the recognitive context. In our daily life we come across many occasions where we recognize a thing on the strength of a reliable statement. 'Who are you'? 'Don't you know, he is John'—'oh, you are the same John, it's nice to meet you'—such recognitions are usual phenomena. Viewing the same from the metaphysical point of view we find that the immediate apprehension of self is a part of our nature, though for total self-consciousness we may have to look to preceptorial or scriptural guidance.[50] On this score the

48. "इह अभिसंधाने द्रष्टृभागबहुमाने च दृक्प्राधान्येन परामृश्यते। ...तथाहि अनभिसंधौ दृश्यभागबहुमाने च दृग्भागो न आद्रियते, अपि तु अर्थभाग एवेति चतुर्धा अनुभवे, षोडशधा च स्मृतौ, उभयस्पृशि च प्रत्यभिज्ञाने चतुःषष्टिधा,...।" *I. P. V. V.*, Part II, pp. 57–58.

Here is a clear incentive to fathom the mental processes and epistemic stages that are behind the recognitive process. But the infantile stage of our studies prevents us from saying more on it.

49. (a) "सोऽहं ममायं विभव इति प्रत्यभिजानतः। ..." इति उक्तनयेन द्विविधां प्रत्यभिज्ञां दर्शयन्...। *Vijñāna-bhairava-udyota*, p. 95.
(b) "एवकारौ निपातौ प्रत्यभिज्ञाद्वैधं सूचयतः।" Ibid., p. 96.
(c) "इति सिद्धा द्विविधा प्रत्यभिज्ञा।" Ibid., p. 97.
(d) "तत् ईश्वरविषयमैश्वर्यम् ममैवेदमैश्वर्यम् इति प्रत्यभिज्ञाविषयीकार्यम्। *Bhāskarī*, Part I, pp. 342–343.
(e) *I. P. V. V.*, Part I, p. 41.

50. (a) *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Part I, p. 37.
(b) "गुरुणा ईश्वरोऽहम् इति प्रत्यभिज्ञापित इति व्यवहारः संभवत्येवेति नान्यथा भ्रमितव्यम्।" *Bhāskarī*, Part I, p. 38.
(c) Ibid., Part II, p. 314.
(d) *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*, pp. 200–201.

Vedāntic illustration e. g., 'you are the tenth' (*daśamas tvam asi*) comes handy as an example of recognition in Trika. Right knowledge (*pramā*) that arises from recognition also goes by the name of recognition. Right knowledge is 'revelation or shining of that-ness'—knowing one as it is.[51] In perceptual knowledge an object is apprehended as it really is, for instance, a blue; perception of inner phenomena such as pleasure etc. consists in apprehending as they are—'I am happy', 'this is blue' etc.. But in recognitive knowledge cognition of object becomes more patent—'this is that blue'. In metaphysics this clearer comprehension of object is its real and right knowledge. This is that, that is, this is identical in its essence with ultimate principle of experience[52] (Maheśvara), the suggested reason being that recognitive relation between the cognizer and the cognized culminates in identity transcending the nature of all other ordinary relations. Consequently the right knowledge and cognizer transpire to be identical.[53]

In this possibly lies the answer to the problem how indeterminate right knowledge arises from determinate knowledge (recognition), because ultimate self-consciousness (*so 'ham*) is indeterminate. In fact, it so happens that the nature of knowledge is determined by the nature of object, knowledge in itself is free from all determinations. Cognitive determinations arise from their objective counterparts. We have already noted that time is imposed on object and not on knowledge. A moment characterizes an object, not knowledge. Ultimate right knowledge, that is, recognitive knowledge is indeterminate because its object 'I' is indeterminate. There being no determination in knowledge, indeterminacy of ultimate recognition automatically flows from it. It is for the same reason that in ordinary recognition the resulting cognition remains determinate because its object happens to be determinate.[54] This is that jar—here, in the knowledge that emerges in the wake of return of the past experience and inclination towards the present, determinacy persists in spite of realization of identity between the two jars. However, since unity of form is more prominently manifest despite the continuance of distinction of time and space etc. ordinary recogni-

51. "तथात्वेन नीलसुखादिभावेन प्रकाशः भानम्, प्रमा।" *Bhāskarī*, Part I, p. 34.

52. "तथाहि—स्फुटतरभासमाननीलसुखादिप्रमान्वेषणद्वारेणैव पारमार्थिकप्रमातृलाभ इह उपदिश्यते।" *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Part I, p. 34.

53. "एवमहमलौकिकः कश्चित् प्रमाता इति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्मा यो विमर्शः—लौकिकसंबन्धस्वभावातिक्रान्त्या तादात्म्यपर्यवसितोपश्लेषः ···।" *Mahārthamañjarī-parimala*, p. 11; compare—"ईश्वरत्वप्रदर्शनं तद्व्यवहारसिद्धिनिबन्धनं प्रमाणं, ततो या प्रतिपत्तिरीश्वरताविमर्शरूपा प्रमात्मिका।" *I. P. V. V.*, Part I, p. 314.

54. "भिन्ने तात्कालिकमभिन्ने पूर्वावस्थया एकीकृतं देहादि यतोऽस्या विषयस्तत इयं न शुद्धो विकल्पो, नापि शुद्धः साक्षात्कारः, अपि तुच्छायामयी प्रत्यभिज्ञा, इत्युच्यते।" *I. P. V. V.*, Part II, p. 314.

tion is considered first step on the way to ultimate synthetic experience.[55] Determination consists in exclusion from the other.[56] In ordinary experience difference is noticed from cognizer to cognizer and from object to object. Wherever there is a counterpositive (*pratiyogin*) of cognition,[57] i. e. its object is contra-distinguishable from another object, that knowledge is invariably determinate or constructional. The 'I' (*aham*) that figures in the ultimate recognitive judgement (I am that -*so'ham*) is different from the ordinary 'I'-consciousness or 'self'-consciousness in the sense that whereas the former is pure consciousness the latter is a referent (in the sense that it contains reference to an object). For the sake of easy comprehension they are respectively termed as pure and impure consciousness. In pure self-consciousness there is no such counterpositive which could be contra-distinguished (*apohana*) or excluded (*vyavaccheda*) because it comprehends totality, cosmic luminosity as such. On the other hand, in impure or empirical self-consciousness the body or the like that comes handy as a referent of 'I' is clearly distinct from other body, jar, etc. Hence, it is determinate or constructional. Each of the pure and impure (metaphysical and empirical) 'I'-consciousness is twofold – experiential (*anubhava*) and synthetic (*anusandhāna*). Be it indeterminate 'I' experience (Śiva stage in the system), or synthetical 'I-this' equation (Sadāśiva stage in the system); in other words, be it self-reflection (*aham-pratyavamarśa*) or self-recognition (*aham-pratyabhijñāna*), it is a state of pure 'I' that reverts in the form of 'this'. Notwithstanding its synthetic character it retains its indeterminate[58] essence in the wake of its completeness and utter rejection of exclusion. Likewise, empirical self-consciousness i. e., 'I am fat' is indicative of the experience of 'I'. And, 'I who was fat have become thin' or 'I who was a child have now become young or aged' connote the synthetic or recognitive knowledge of 'I'. Both the situations are determinate.[59] Empirical self-recognition, thus, may be placed on par with all synthetic cognitions and, for that matter, with all empirical recognitions.

It appears that the Advaita Vedāntin is also caught on the horns of a similar dilemma while opting for the indeterminate nature of recognitive

55. *Baāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Pt. I, p. 327.

56. "अन्यवस्तुव्यवच्छेदप्राणो विकल्पः।" Ibid. (commentary).

57. "प्रतियोगी समकक्ष्यतया प्रतिस्पर्धी।" Ibid., p. 313.

58. "यदि हि तस्य देहादेः सर्वतः पूर्णत्वम् अवच्छेदहीनत्वं पश्यन् अनुसन्धानम् 'अहमिदम्' इति विदध्यात् तदियं सदाशिवभूः केन विकल्पास्पदत्वेन भण्येत्, यावता विच्छिन्ने एव सोऽनुसंधिः।" *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Part I, p. 326.

59. "तत्र शुद्धे विकल्परूपत्वमप्रतिष्ठमेव इत्युक्तम्, अशुद्धे तु अनुभवरूपे विकल्पत्वमुपपादितम्, अशुद्धेऽपि तु अनुसंधानात्मकतया अभेदस्य प्रस्फुरणात् कश्चिदविकल्पकत्वं शङ्केत तस्य व्यामोहं व्यामोहितुमाह···सा योजना सर्वा कल्पना विकल्प एव, न तु शुद्धः प्रत्यवमर्शः।" Ibid., pp. 324–325.

knowledge. He has tried to establish it from a new angle. To him the indeterminacy of knowledge depends upon the indeterminacy of the object it intends to apprehend. For something to be an object of knowledge arising from sentences the criterion is that it should apprehend the intention and not the relation between the meaning of the words.[60]

To say that the sentences like 'thou art that' convey a single notion of identity is only to mean that they produce right knowledge that does not apprehend the relation among the meaning of the words. It is indeed curious to note that what Vedānta achieves by negating the relation Trika does so by affirming their identity.

This line of thinking automatically leads us to another problem. Does the Pratyabhijñā claim the relation of identity, like Advaita Vedānta, to be a general relation or view it as identical with Hegelian identity-in-difference relationship. However, it must be cautioned that the Vedāntin does not claim identity to be the general relation between the subject and the predicate of every proposition. And as such all judgements do not signify identity. But this does not mean that there is no proposition that signifies identity. This identity is realised, as already hinted earlier, by affirming the singleness of the object of thought and rejecting the incompatible determinants. This Vedāntic method is not to be confused, warns Dr. D. M. Dutta,[61] with the Hegelian concept of identity-in-difference. It is true that the identity always presupposes difference but it surely does not presuppose a difference that continues to be as real as identity. This sort of presupposition does make both the terms equally real to the thought. However, the position of the Trika philosopher is different. He views both the terms as equally real. On the empirical plane there is no denying the fact that difference continues to be as real as identity. Even on the metaphysical level the position does not change much but for one thing that difference is synthesized with or reconciled into (and not denied, rejected or sublated) identity. Thus recognition ceases to be a mere tautology; instead it introduces a new element in our knowledge resulting from the judgement. This new element is reflected in the realization of the identity through the differing modes of the single object of thought.

Effort has been made to provide psychological basis to the metaphysical moorings of Recognition School. If self is *per se* identical with the ultimate principle, recognition ceases to have any purpose. On the maximum,

60. ननु वाक्यजन्यज्ञानस्य पदार्थसंसर्गावगाहितया कथं निर्विकल्पकम् ? उच्यते । वाक्यजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वे हि न पदार्थसंसर्गत्वं तन्त्रम्, अनभिमतसंसर्गस्यापि वाक्यजन्यज्ञानविषयत्वापत्तेः किन्तु तात्पर्यविषयत्वम् ।

61. Vide, *Six Ways of Knowing*, pp. 321–330.

perception may serve the purpose. Behind self-recognition, therefore, there is no pragmatic compulsion. In reply, Pratyabhijñā believes in two-tier efficacy (*arthakriyā*) of an object — external and internal. Whether or not a seed is recognised as such, it will generate a sprout (though it may be argued that recognition of a seed will be necessary for raising a particular plant). Thus sprouting is a sort of external efficacy and recognition is not required here. But, for the subjective efficacies of the cognizer like pleasure or satisfaction the value of recognition cannot be ignored. Like 'this is that' where unification of thisness and thatness is prominent, 'I am that' (*so 'ham*) too, where identity of I-ness and universal that-ness (*tattva*) surfaces itself, is essentially recognitive. While in the former event subjective reaction of the cognizer is pleasure (pain, hatred or aversion or for that matter any feeling), in the latter event it is perfect bliss. That is to say, subjective reactions arising from recognition are different from those arising from other cognitive acts and it is these reactions that necessitate instrumental activity of recognition.[62]

Recognition has been posited as a sole means to self-realization in Pratyabhijñā School. We shall try to understand the philosophical reasoning that has gone into such postulation. Mental process may be of two types — one, cognitive and the other, recognitive. The first process consists in selecting an object, that is, it picks an object and in so doing it rejects, excludes or negates the other (than that) objects by implication. In the other process there is no selection, choosing or picking up. It is a state of complete affirmation and comprehension, that is, it consists in total approval, return or rehappening of one's past experience. That is, there is no negation, sublation or exclusion and the like.

In most systems of Indian Philosophy, whether Vedānta, Sāṅkhya, or Nyāya, the process of ultimate knowledge is cognitive. Self-cognition is synonymous with self-realization. Consequently there is affirmation of a content or object (self) of experience and negation or rejection of the other (not-self).

For instance in *sarvaṁ khalv idaṁ Brahma, neha nānā 'sti kiñcana* is found declaration of absolutic unity of 'all' (*sarva*) but at the same time there is also found negation of 'all-ness' (total variety –*nānārūpatā*). On the other hand, in Pratyabhijñā School all objects are identical as being one with Śiva and their 'all-ness' (*sarvatā*) is also real : *Sarvapadārthānāṁ samaiva Śivatā sthitā*. Here sublation, negation or rejection becomes irrelevant.

62. *Bhāskarī* (*vimarśinī*), Pt. II, pp. 312–315; *I. P. V. V.*, Pt. III, p. 403; *Anuttarāṣṭikā* –4.

The present analysis leads us to another direction. Sāṅkhya, Vedānta, and Nyāya do not go beyond a particular point. In Sāṅkhya it is isolation (*kaivalya*), in Yoga restraint (*nirodha*), in Nyāya self-subsistence (*svasthatā*) and in Vedānta removal of nescience (*avidyā-nivṛtti*). The process of self-realization is identical on the whole with discaiminating between self and not-self, distinguishing between the two. Amongst themselves these systems may adopt à different line altogether in regard to the precise nature of self and not-self as well as in regard to their mutual interaction, but there is no exception to the fact that salvation or self-realization follows upon differentiating the self from the not-self. This entire psychophysical complex and empirical universe belongs to the realm of not-self and it either inheres in or is superimposed upon or reflected in or otherwise identified with the self. The discrimination, therefore, between the two somewhere consists in negation and somewhere appears as negation. Salvation is, therefore, negation or suppression of the not-self.

But in Pratyabhijñā self-realization consists in harmonizing the two polarities (Śiva and Śakti). It is, therefore, synthesis of two principles and negation of the neither. It also makes sublimation of our empirical experiences into pure and trans-empirical or spiritual ones possible. Each level of experience is a step towards self-realization—where both the opposites are real. Pratyabhijñā goes to explain this particular achievement wherein lay both Thisness (principle of not-self) and I-ness (principle of self) and where both are predicated, both are valid and both are mutually harmonious. The two do not contradict each other; each rather seeks its fulfilment in the other.[63]

63. "तत्र दर्पणस्य इव अनेकाभासभेद एकतामनपबाधमानो न विरोधमावहति, इति उक्तेनिबाधप्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षप्रसाधितैकभावः पदार्थ आभाससारस्तथाभूतानेव विरुद्धानाकारान् स्वात्मनि उपगच्छन् हठादेव क्रमिकांस्तानाभासभेदानात्मनि अभिन्ने भासयन्…।" *I. P. V. V.*, Part III, p. 3.